Marine Transportation System

Archive for the ‘MTS Policy’ Category

Europe is Breaking the Egg

In Efficiency, Energy/Environ, Infrastructure, MTS Policy, Ports on October 5, 2014 at 11:16 pm

Before we get to John Graykowski’s “Europe is Breaking the Egg” I would like to pose my own chicken-and-the-egg question as one might ask it here in Wonkington, D.C. Which comes first: the policy or the strategy? One might also ponder how good is a forward looking strategy when the policy is of the past century. The Maritime Administration is preparing a “National Maritime Strategy.” It is a principal objective of Administrator Chip Jaenichen and probably has been encouraged by congressional supporters of the U.S. flag industry who, like most of us, have not liked seeing the merchant fleet decline but who, unlike us, are in a position to redefine U.S. maritime policy. The piece below begs the question whether a new national maritime strategy would benefit by first fixing the national maritime policy that for the most part has been in place while the United States lost its prominent role in world shipping. Certainly it would make it easier on Mr. Jaenichen and the Secretary of Transportation to have an updated national policy framework as a basis for new strategies to get to where we need to be. John Graykowski’s article first appeared in Pacific Maritime Magazine on September 1, 2014. You can find it here. He poses the policy question in the context of a growing American supply of natural gas and the multiple benefits to be realized by fostering a bunker switch to LNG. This is the third in his series for MTS Matters on the subject of developing LNG distribution infrastructure to advance the adoption of LNG as a marine fuel. It also is a recurring theme in these pages.  Pbea

We may soon be able to retire the tiresome “chicken and egg” cliché to describe LNG development, since there has been movement in the last year in Europe and the United States that indicates the circle may be breaking; but it’s too soon to tell whether the movement is temporary or permanent. What is apparent, however, it that Europe has moved forward in a more focused and strategic way, to create LNG infrastructure and markets, which is yielding results. By 2016, permanent LNG bunkering facilities will be in operation in Rotterdam and Antwerp – both among the largest ports in the world – thereby signaling that the supply uncertainties have been resolved. It bears asking, therefore, how Europe has done this, and whether we should consider similar measures here if the goal is to expand LNG as a marine and transportation fuel throughout the United States.

In 2008, Norway effectively made LNG the preferred fuel choice for marine operators through a combination of regulatory mandates relating to Nitrogen Oxide (NOx) and financial incentives covering up to 80 percent of the capital cost of the LNG-related components. Following these actions, the number of Norwegian vessels using LNG as a primary fuel went from 3 to 12 vessels in five years, with more than 50 vessels of various types now under construction along with the supporting LNG infrastructure. Concurrent with this, Norway is addressing the regulatory and operational issues, and is now seen as a leader in marine LNG development.

The European Union (EU) is also pursuing a comprehensive effort to increase LNG as a marine fuel with the goal of developing LNG infrastructure in every major seaport by 2020, and every inland terminal by 2025; a total of 139 ports across Europe. This goal coincides with estimates that by 2020, 1,700 dual fuel vessels will be built or converted worldwide, with many of these operating in, or calling on, the EU.

By 2020, the United Arab Shipping Corporation (USAC) dual fuel container vessels will be operating between the Far East and Europe. This activity will spawn additional interest and movement in Europe and among its global trading partners leading to a rapid transition from diesel to LNG as a major transportation fuel.

The EU is employing a “carrot and stick” approach combining financial support for the conversion and construction of vessels and infrastructure with increased regulation. Projects such as the Trans-European Network for Transport (Ten-T) and the Rhine-Main-Danube initiatives have produced significant results. $139 million has already been allocated to 7 Ten-T projects to support vessel conversion and LNG infrastructure development, with more funding promised. Support of up to 50 percent of project costs is available for vessel conversion, construction and infrastructure, and just recently the first inland dual fuel barge was delivered and will shortly begin operations.

The EU adopted an approach that combines: (1) clear and defined goals that LNG will displace traditional marine fuels; (2) increased environmental regulations; (3) financial incentives to spur the initial transition; and (4) coordination among ports, governments; regulatory agencies and stakeholders to create uniform regulatory structures. Given the intrinsic advantages of LNG, there is recognition that the market would likely drive toward greater adoption of LNG without assistance. However, many vessel owners and gas suppliers are reluctant to be the first to make the investments in LNG vessels and infrastructure regardless of the advantages. The EU has determined that these measures are necessary in order to reduce perceived risks, accelerate market decisions, and attain the stated goals for LNG deployment.

In contrast, the United States does not have a national policy to support LNG as a marine and transportation fuel. Instead, our LNG market is developing project-by-project, driven by first-adopters such as Harvey Gulf, Tote, Matson, and Crowley with no federal support or strategy; despite the tremendous benefits LNG offers to the country. While we have seen some movement in disparate locations, there is not so much as a policy statement that commits this country to the development of LNG as a transportation fuel; and there are certainly no programs to support the construction of vessels and infrastructure to make this possible nor to address regulatory uncertainties and enhance public acceptance of LNG.

The challenges and obstacles that exist here are no different from those in Europe, and LNG is new to everyone. It appears, however, that the EU has tackled this question in a more coherent, direct, and proactive way that is rapidly producing results. To be sure, there are major differences between the US and the EU in terms of governmental structures and processes. The EU can promulgate Europe-wide regulations and implement promotional programs, and has a history of doing so. Here, that role would be shared between Congress and the Executive Branch, and that is yet another challenge given the continuing dysfunction between both branches of government.

A policy declaring that LNG as a transportation fuel is in the national interest, and committing to the support, promotion and encouragement of its development would have several immediate effects:

  • It would be a clear signal to all potential stakeholders that LNG is “real” and has the backing of Congress and Administration;
  • It would put federal agencies on notice – and could require them– to collaborate with industry on practical and uniform regulation, reduced delays and greater certainty; and
  • It could include limited and temporary financial incentives such as loan guarantees or tax incentives to accelerate LNG conversion, because early adopters should be encouraged in order to build a sustaining market that benefits the entire country.

Federal resources are constrained, but without a national commitment, LNG may not gain the critical mass and momentum to create a long-term viable market. Regulatory direction is important, and does not involve direct costs, but if combined with properly structured and managed loan guarantees or tax incentives they would have a greater likelihood of jump-starting this industry at low risk and large benefit to the whole nation in emissions reductions, energy independence, economic activity in shipyards and elsewhere. The promise of LNG is so great it deserves this sort of recognition, attention, and effort. Clearly the EU sees it that way, and we should as well and the risk if we don’t address it in this way is diminished potential for LNG to transform this country and the lost opportunity to lead the world in LNG development and utilization.   John Graykowski

LNG: Ports as a Catalyst?

In Energy/Environ, Green Transportation, MTS Policy, Ports on October 10, 2013 at 8:47 am

MTS Matters welcomes a well-known and regarded figure in D.C. transportation circles. John Graykowski, a Principal of Maritime Industry Consultants, served as Deputy Administrator of the Maritime Administration, and for two years as Acting Administrator, during the Clinton Administration. He is an attorney with experience in both private and public sectors. The subject of LNG-fueled transportation and how it might develop in the context of maritime policy and port communities has been a focus of his attention in recent years. This is the first of his contributions to this blog’s musings on port/maritime policy—present and future.

Over the past year, LNG as a marine fuel has gone from novel concept to an accepted alternative fuel here in the United States. Some LNG-capable vessels are operating and more will be under construction as appreciation is growing for the environmental, economic and energy security benefits offered by LNG. This transformation of a marine cargo commodity to emerging marine fuel in here and elsewhere might lead one to conclude that the broad deployment of LNG throughout the U.S. is underway and faces no challenges or constraints—but this is not the case. Lagging behind LNG-fueled vessel development here are the necessary market and regulatory structures that promote its widespread development.

The most common platitude in any discussion of LNG is the “chicken and egg” problem. Ship owners are loathe to make the large capital investment in LNG technologies absent certainty of supply.  Meanwhile gas suppliers are averse to spending $150 million or more on bunkering infrastructure without firm, long term purchase contracts by ship owners. This reflects the lack of historic relationships between the gas supply industry and marine operators, who purchase bunker fuel in virtually every port on a spot basis and never needed long term contracts.

Compounding that is a lack of understanding and knowledge about each other’s industries. Marine operators are not familiar with gas production, transportation and market dynamics and gas suppliers have little direct knowledge about the marine industry practices, requirements, and the like. Emblematic of the divide between the two industries is the simple fact that marine operators purchase fuel on the basis of metric tons or barrels of oil, while the gas industry sells LNG on the basis of million BTUs. Potentially complicating this market disconnect, are increasingly stringent accounting rules that likely require a long term LNG contract to be carried as a contingent liability, thus impairing a balance sheet and constraining future capital expenditures for a marine company.

Beyond these market issues are significant regulatory challenges related to both operational procedures for bunkering vessels and, more importantly, the siting, permitting and operation of small and medium sized LNG marine terminals. It may come as a surprise to some, but there are no existing uniform federal regulatory structures that apply specifically to LNG marine fueling terminals.

The United States Coast Guard (USCG) and Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Administration (PHMSA) each have regulations that apply to LNG fueling terminals. These regulations, however, were developed with large scale export and import facilities in mind and thus are largely inapplicable to a small marine fuel terminal and the fueling of other than LNG carriers. In many cases these regulations may conflict, which creates a large area of potential regulatory confusion and will most likely result in ad hoc development of LNG regulations. Adding to this uncertainty is the probable requirement that these facilities will be subject to local permitting actions, which can provide opponents of LNG the opportunity to intervene and delay the project.

Where do ports fit in this puzzle of a marketplace?

Ports can and should be a catalyst to spur LNG development throughout the transportation industries since they are at the center of marine activities in the United States. They provide a ready-made, multi-modal market for LNG expansion beyond large oceangoing vessels, which includes ferries and harbor craft, trucking, and rail operations. Port agencies may have some degree of jurisdiction, and even control, over property where LNG operations will occur. Depending on the port, it may have a role in the siting, permitting, financing, development, or even operations of an LNG fueling terminal. As a responsible economic development agency, a port can also play a critical role in the public education and promotion of LNG and the mitigation of local opposition to such projects.

Public port agencies generally understand this is a constructive role they are in a position to play. We are seeing that in isolated initiatives, notably on the West Coast, as well on an international scale with Antwerp leading a working group that includes the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach.

The expansion of LNG and compressed natural gas (CNG) as a replacement fuel in port related operations, already showing benefits, is also a powerful tool that ports can use to achieve significant emissions reductions and thus reduce the cost and impact of increasingly more stringent environmental regulations or measures to meet local community demands. If LNG is used to fuel vessels’ auxiliary generators while in port there may be no need to install costly shore power systems for cold ironing since equivalent emissions results could be obtained with LNG.

Collectively, ports can be in the forefront of a “Green” initiative, leading to the expansion of LNG as a transportation fuel throughout the nation. Individually, ports that facilitate LNG bunkering operations could find them to be a competitive factor in attracting and retaining liner business as those companies bring LNG-capable vessels on line to meet IMO global standards by 2020.

Much has been written of the significant impact that domestically produced natural gas and its liquefied form will have on our on our nation. Ports are where all surface modes of commercial transportation intersect and where LNG distribution will naturally occur. They are in a position to be influential in the development of national policies that promote and accommodate the broad deployment of LNG as a transportation fuel.
John E. Graykowski

 

Bottom Line Thoughts on the MTS

In Congress, Federal Government, Infrastructure, Marine Highway, MTS Policy, Ports on September 17, 2013 at 11:30 pm

AASHTO, the association of State DOT chiefs, issued this summer the last of its “bottom line” modal reports. This one–Waterborne Freight Transportation–is a useful addition to the studies and papers that indicate a marine transportation system in great need of policy attention. It is not that the MTS is in failing condition–certainly not that part engaged in international commerce–but “the very success of the MTS has masked serious underlying structural problems” that, if left unaddressed, “pose critical threats to the long-term health of the MTS and the nation as a whole.”

The report notes that unlike the American interstate highway system the MTS “has evolved without larger scale coordinated policy and planning.” Indeed the ports and related infrastructure and services that developed without a “master plan” make the MTS a “collection of competitors.”  Persons who follow action in the ports of Charleston and Savannah, both overseen by State port authorities and championed by their respective State legislatures, can be fascinated watching that competition in real time.

The AASHTO report, the focus of which lands principally on the MTS infrastructure, identifies areas requiring attention. Waterway maintenance needs are not being met, navigation projects often take far too long to accomplish, funding for MTS expansion needs is uncertain, national investments are not being effectively targeted to meet national needs, and responsibility for the MTS in official Washington is widely diffused.  That last item can be easily understood by looking at the “comprehensive matrix” spreadsheet on the CMTS website.

In a statement that could apply to maritime elements of the private sector as much as it most definitely does to government policy, the AASHTO report offers this bottom line thought: “Embracing business as usual will inevitably lead to significant further declines in MTS condition and performance, and to lost opportunities for our transportation system and economy.” Today, former Pennsylvania Governor Ed Rendell, the nation’s inconvenient truth teller on matters infrastructure, and National Association of Manufacturers CEO Jay Timmons used the Philadelphia port as a backdrop for a similar message that is bolstered by a survey of manufacturers. “Improving our ports, highways, and bridges is essentially an economic driver. Modernized ports and transportation systems enable American manufacturers and businesses to export their goods to countries around the world, which strengthens our economy here at home,” said Rendell.

Much of that message in Philly and the AASHTO report is centered on international commerce, understandably. Ports and their modal connectors enable U.S. exports to make it to other markets in competitive fashion. They also speed imported goods to Costco shelves and components to American assembly plants.

One had to look for it, but the AASHTO “bottom line” document also makes the suggestion, however briefly, that the MTS can play an increasingly important role stateside. With reference to the potential for Marine Highway freight transport the document notes that “with growing highway congestion, waterborne transportation becomes an even more attractive transportation alternative.” It concludes with the statement that “[w]aterborne trade and transportation will be cornerstones of the 21st century economy.”

Among the actions called for in the report is the establishment of an office of multimodal freight at USDOT, an oft-made recommendation by various stakeholders and in the reports of appointed and self-appointed commissions. Among the tasks of the office would be to create a “system map and classification of MTS facilities, analogous to the National Highway System and the National Freight Network.” Congress specified in MAP-21 that the designated NFN be highway only, a decision that reflects more the congressional committee jurisdictions and the “highway bill” tradition than it does the multimodal operating freight sector. (A recently introduced House bill, H.R. 2875, grandly named the “Waterfront of Tomorrow Act,” would amend MAP-21 to “ensure that ports and harbors are incorporated into the national freight network.”)

The recommended freight office would also be used to prepare a “long-range vision plan for the national MTS development and investment to meet national transportation and economic development objectives.” The report also calls for full utilization of Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund monies for navigation infrastructure maintenance as well as an exemption from the Harbor Maintenance Tax for “domestic Marine Highway services.”

These recommendations are pointed in a constructive direction. But there is a missing element in the report. More significantly, it also is missing from the national transportation policy discussion on Capitol Hill, in those many departments and agencies tagged on the CMTS spreadsheet, and in the White House, then and now.  What is missing is visible interest in what the national maritime policy need be. The weakest element of the multifaceted American marine transportation system, oddly enough, is marine transportation. The long, sloping trend line representing flagging support for U.S.-flag merchant shipping, an aging Jones Act coastal fleet that frustrates Marine Highway development, and a shrinking ship building sector needs to be reversed.  It’s far from being the cornerstone of the economy that it once was and perhaps still can be.  Pbea

The Late Senator Frank Lautenberg

In Congress, Environment, Federal Government, Leadership, MTS Policy, New York Harbor, Politics, Ports, Security, Surface Transportation Policy, Water Resources on June 9, 2013 at 11:53 pm

Frank_Lautenberg,_official_portrait

Senator Frank Lautenberg
1924 – 2013

Last Friday was a somber day of steady rain as New Jersey Senator Frank Lautenberg was buried at Arlington National Cemetery. News reports this past week cited how his passing was notable because he was the last sitting senator of the “greatest generation,” that chamber’s last veteran of World War II. His death came just months after Hawaii’s Senator Daniel Inouye, a wounded veteran of that war, took his resting place among the nation’s noted military and civilian leaders at Arlington.

(They also had a common  interest in the MTS—the marine transportation system. Inouye was a reliable and principal advocate for American shipping; Lautenberg for the landside elements—the ports and intermodal connections. Both were friends of labor.)

It need be said that Senator Lautenberg’s death on June 3, also is notable because it marked the passing of a champion of Federal policy to making communities healthier, the environment cleaner, and industry and travel safer and better. It was a personal agenda well suited to his home State of New Jersey but carried out with no less than the nation in mind.

In his 28 years as a senator he served on virtually every committee and subcommittee that touched on authorizing and funding transportation, civil works and environmental policy. For a period he chaired the Transportation Subcommittee on Appropriations while as a senior member of the Environment & Public Works Committee (EPW).  For a few years after the attack of September 2001 he also was on the Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs Committee. In recent years he chaired the Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine, Infrastructure, Safety and Security Subcommittee of the Senate Commerce, Science & Transportation Committee (CST). In recent years he served on EPW, CST and Appropriations, including the Corps funding subcommittee, concurrently.

As was evident in his committee work his approach to legislating was to cover all the bases, or at least as many as he could. He championed improving airports and the aviation system, expanding the use of transit and passenger rail, modernizing freight transportation, bringing American port infrastructure to world standards, and securing them all from the those who would do us harm.

He was appointed to the President’s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism after the tragic downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, and returned to the Senate, after a two-year hiatus, to help write and oversee anti-terrorism law after the downing of the World Trade Center towers. In those towers he had served on the Board of Commissioners of the Port Authority of New York & New Jersey before being elected senator in 1982. His time with the Port Authority–and his building the Automatic Data Processing Corporation (ADP) from scratch–were credits on his resume in which he took great pride and enjoyed telling people about if the occasion would allow.

Frank Lautenberg put much effort into environmental issues. He gave his attention to the recovery of old industrial wastelands through brownfields initiatives and Superfund legislation and to making the Toxic Substances Control Act more effective. He was protecting the coastline whether the recreation beaches or the nurturing marshlands. In his last year he walked the Jersey Shore in the wake of Superstorm Sandy, secured bi-partisan support for his toxic substances legislation and, from his wheel chair, cast his final vote in support of tighter gun legislation.

He was a tough fellow and could be an relentless advocate.  Just ask the trucking industry that couldn’t budge him from the centerline where he stood in the way of increasing truck size and weight limits year after year after year. Ask the FAA whose employees’ merit increases were at risk while their work was incomplete on the redesign of East Coast airspace in the Newark/LaGuardia/JFK market. Ask Norfolk Southern and CSX who found the Senator immovable on key issues pertaining to assuring competitive rail service for his home port when Conrail’s assets were on the block. Was he always the advocate that some of us wanted him to be? No, but then you rarely find a senator who is that agreeable.

From start-to-finish Senator Frank Lautenberg was an advocate for his New Jersey and his United States, which he strove to make  better by improving the quality of people’s lives and the means of commerce.    Pbea

(A version of this ran on The Ferguson Group blog.)

 
 

Two Trust Funds in Search of a Solution

In Infrastructure, MTS Policy, Ports, Water Resources on October 25, 2012 at 3:31 pm

Yesterday Tennessee Senator Lamar Alexander (R) stood near Chickamauga Lock in Chattanooga and said, “We have two trust funds to deal with waterway infrastructure like the Chickamauga Lock, and neither of them works.”  He tells the truth.

The senator and former governor convened a presser to preview legislation–the American Waterways Act–that he and others will introduce when Congress resumes its session after the November election. The still in draft bill would tackle some financially challenging issues because the Inland Waterways Trust Fund (river system) and the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund (for the most part coastal ports) are both at the center of current navigation infrastructure problems and the ultimate solutions to those problems.

The IWTF fund, with collections from a fuel tax on commercial vessels operating on the inland system, raises insufficient funds for what is a large, backlogged demand for lock and dam construction and rehab work. The users of the system have proposed changes in cost-sharing as well as increases in the fuel tax.

As has been discussed elsewhere in MTS Matters the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund is a problem of a different kind. The ad valorem tax on cargo raises sufficient funds to cover the nation’s channel maintenance requirements but the Administration and Congress do not spend O&M funds at a rate commensurate with collections. The crafters of the planned bill are said to be working on how to assure annual appropriations at full-use levels as well as to free the accumulating surplus–now above $7 billion–for port projects.

The greatest challenge in drafting the legislation is the high hurdle presented by congressional budget rules. Based on what we have heard, the drafters intend to enable  the spending of tens of billions of dollars for construction and maintenance work over a 5 to 10 year period.  Even if the existing and future collections from the fuel and cargo taxes can handle that, as is the plan, Congress would have to effectively waive budget rules to get past procedural barriers. That doesn’t happen often. Moreover, it would require consensus among the key actors and probably a majority in the House and a super-majority in the Senate.

And while there has been significant growth in the ranks of advocates on these issues, solutions to the IWTF and HMTF problems have yet to achieve that kind of consensus.

The AWA–if it isn’t premature to assign an abbreviation to a measure not yet introduced–would have other provisions.  Senator Alexander identified these:

  • address regulatory and permit process streamlining projects by adopting the MAP-21 approach to speeding projects;
  • shift the 50/50 cost-sharing requirement for coastal channel maintenance from 45 feet to apply to those channels deeper than 50 feet;
  • open the HMTF to now ineligible port projects, to include landside projects (especially to satisfy ports like Los Angeles that don’t have much in the way of O&M dredging needs);
  • authorize a 5-year construction program to advance projects to deepen ports to accommodate post-panamax ships needing around 50-foot depths (to include Charleston and other planned deepenings that meet the present 3.0 benefit/cost test);
  • make the increasingly expensive Olmsted Lock project on the Ohio River a fully Federal responsibility, which would free IWTF resources to start other waiting construction projects; and
  • require the Federal government to follow the Inland Waterways Capital Development Plan developed by the industry and Corps of Engineers for an increase in the fuel tax and a 20-year schedule for projects.

The guts of the Inland Waterways Capital Development Plan were put into legislative language found in HR 4342, the WAVE 4 Act,  introduced earlier this year byRep. Ed Whitfield (R-KY). Worth noting, the Administration put forward a different proposal to address the ITWF problem and had been at loggerheads with the industry with no agreement in sight.

The likely sponsors of AWA are from both parties and will include principal sponsors Lamar Alexander and Lindsey Graham (R-SC), plus others who may include Dianne Feinstein (D-CA).  Feinstein and Alexander are the lead senators on the appropriations subcommittee that funds the civil works program.

Why are senators talking about introducing a controversial reform bill soon before the 112th Congress comes to a close? There are several answers, one of which is that the House and Senate are preparing to tackle major fiscal and revenue decisions (see “fiscal cliff“). Resolving the navigation trust fund problems could be made easier as part of the larger debate.  Also, as I mentioned in The WRDA Mantra post, an effort may be made to move water resources legislation (WRDA) during lame duck.  The AWA is squarely in WRDA territory and Alexander needs to be ready to jump on-board even if the odds of WRDA advancing are slim to none.  Push come to shove, the senators who introduce the AWA bill this year will be staking claim to the issue in the next congress.

Let’s face it.  The American Waterways Act, as it has been developing in the months leading up to Senator Alexander’s announcement, is an extremely ambitious package.  It will entail getting Congress to approve significant hikes in commercial navigation project spending, increase the fuel tax, venture into the touchy subject of expanding uses of the HMTF, and streamline permitting on some water resource projects that have been a favorite target of environmental conservation organizations…none of which are reasons to put a halt to such ambitious foolishness.

Said Lamar Alexander yesterday, “The Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund collects a lot of money, but doesn’t spend it well. The Inland Waterways Trust Fund doesn’t collect much money, but spends it well. This bill would fix the way our ports and waterways are funded so that we can meet the challenges they face…”

Here’s a challenge for a do-something Congress.  Pbea

Stalled and Sinking

In Marine Highway, MTS Policy on June 10, 2012 at 11:13 pm

POLITICO, the Washington, DC daily journal, published a story on May 22nd by reporter Jessica Meyers on one of my favorite topics, marine highway development. I had hoped for more but then a partisan, as I am, is always hard to please.

It was the multiple titles sitting atop the various pages and editions of the piece that got to me. Like taunts from the headline writer. “Industry appears stalled on marine highways.” “Federal marine highways project hard to launch.”  And one that elicited a quiet groan, “Marine highways projects often sink.” All for a single article.

You’d think one title would suffice.

It’s hard to argue with the conclusions of a writer whose research uncovers little evidence of successful services, hears sources say there is no market or that it is still being identified, and then calls it as she or he sees it.

Let’s face it. The shelf isn’t lined with gleaming trophies of winning marine highway projects.

Then there was this piece that appeared the next day in Lloyd’s List entitled “Built in the USA.”  “Tobias Koenig’s decision to withdraw financial support from American Feeder Lines…has opened a fresh debate on the US-build requirement of the 1920 law.”

Whether the frustration of a European shipping investor (“we intend to profit from the opportunities, and to profit well”) who had hoped to reinvent American coastal shipping and ship building has given us a fresh debate, or is just another log to grow the flames of the US-build debate, isn’t so important.

The fact is the debate continues and the heat is being felt. Others–whether Hawaiian shippers or Connecticut-based Per Heidenreich–are among the more recent voices for change.  The US-build requirement is typically the target.

The above articles point to the challenge facing marine highway service start-ups and the broader Jones Act container/trailer carrier community whose market is pretty much limited to the non-contiguous trade and whose fleet has far too many old fuel burners for the new Emissions Control Area (ECA) age we are about to enter.

Two weeks prior to those articles going to print The Maritime Executive folks convened a long planned “Revitalizing the Maritime Industry” forum. It was a Jones Act centric program and audience, although there might have been some outliers in the room.

The two-day program opened with a plainly stated concern about how the Jones Act industry today finds itself in the position of having to defend the cabotage principle instead of the onus being on challengers to explain why it would be in the nation’s interest to allow the Jones Act walls to tumble.

John Graykowski, former Deputy Administrator of MARAD and Jones Act advocate, said at the opening of the forum that “the future isn’t as clear or…as bright as any of us would like it to be.” He noted “challenges” that don’t seem to diminish and “an ever present growing threat” to the Jones Act. He pointed to fewer maritime industry advocates today in government, and to challenges to the cargo preference program and the protected non-contiguous trade.

In the background, as one easily took from the forum’s title, was the fact that important elements of the Jones Act industry have been in decline for too long a time, a condition that the marine highway effort hopes to reverse.

Along the way there were unequivocal and unchallenged statements heard in the hall as to the importance of the domestic maritime sector to the nation, the competitiveness of American crews and the competitiveness of American shipyards. Also heard was the immutability of the Jones Act.

The problem isn’t that it is broke, the message went. The problem is that aggressors are gathering at the gate and our defenders are fewer. This is a time for a collective “gut check.” The walls must be defended. Whatever happens, the law ain’t gonna change.

A few people with microphones suggested the need for some flexibility in the law. A short term reflagging of suitable, foreign built ships to enable a demonstration of marine highway service in the North Atlantic is an example that I suggested. (I argued that position on behalf of American Feeder Lines in its attempt earlier this year to win government approval of a limited waiver with the condition that US-built ships would be ordered to replace them.)

There were Jones Act defenders in the room who themselves are frustrated with the no-exceptions perspective. But it is a frustration that is not given expression in public, certainly not in a gathering such as this.

Cabotage is a principle important to the national economy and defense. However, as I suggested in a presentation at the forum, the present law is nearly 100 years old.  “I don’t think that living in the twentieth century today is necessarily how we get” to a revitalized American industry. The principle is sound but how we get to a revitalized industry, including a stronger shipbuilding sector, is the question.  Once revitalized the industry can be more successful in defending both the principle and the gate.

MarEx Editor-in-Chief Tony Munoz, convener of the event, concluded the program by saying the forum and the attendees are the “tip of the spear” to “move this agenda forward.”

But, I wonder, will preserving every jot and tittle of the status quo be the only element of that agenda?  Pbea

An earlier version of this appeared in the “Deep Water Port notes” newsletter of the Connecticut Maritime Coalition.

HMTF: The Seven Billion Dollar Clue

In MTS Policy, Ports, Water Resources on February 11, 2012 at 6:04 pm

The Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund (HMTF) is overdue for a remedy. How do we know? The unspent balance of Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT) receipts, plus interest, is a mere $7,000,000,000.

HMT receipts are accounted for in the channel “maintenance” trust fund. However (not to be too picky) the Federal channel system is not fully maintained, and not for lack of money (see “mere” above). That and other information can be found in this 2011 report by the Congressional Research Service.

(A Moment for Trivia: The HMT is considered by some folks a user fee but as the Supreme Court figured out, unanimously and with little effort, the value-based charge on cargo bears little relationship to the service being provided i.e., maintaining channel depths and other dimensions for vessels, and “therefore does not qualify as a permissible user fee” under the export clause of the Constitution.)

The HMT is collected on import and domestic cargo handled at most US ports. On cruise tickets, too. The majority of what is collected comes from the high volume, high value imports; much less from comparatively low value domestic cargo moving between American ports. US exports cannot be charged, sez the Supreme Court.

The HMT was set to cover 100 percent of the cost of coastal channel maintenance. But if 100 percent of the channel maintenance that is needed isn’t done then 100 percent of the funds isn’t spent. It’s the kind of math that even I can understand.

Well, you might say, that’s okay because the money is safe in a trust fund. It is dedicated for maintenance dredging, right? It will be there when it’s needed, right?

Sure, but the balance has grown every year since 1994 and, more to the point, full funding is justified now. According to the Corps of Engineers the total channel system, including small recreational harbors, would cost around $1.3 billion a year. And even if the money is sitting in a trust fund collecting interest, it actually is being put to an unrelated purpose. Turns out the HMTF is a handy offset, especially when you are running a Federal deficit. Makes the deficit a little lower–$7,000,000,000 lower.

The money is collected for a specific purpose but is not being spent fully for that purpose. More than a few folks argue that is not fair. Especially the ones who have a direct stake in channel dredging such as ports and dredging contractors.

But then fairness has been an issue since the HMT and the HMTF were made law.

In the mid-80s Congress deliberated how to offset the cost of Federal channel maintenance (originally by 40 percent and then a few years later by 100 percent). Some ports argued that because heavy cargo weighs down a ship the new user fee for maintaining channel depth should applied to cargo tonnage.

Other ports took the opposite view, pointing to how heavier cargoes are often low value as well as low margin US exports. They said the charge should be on cargo value, arguing that containerized cargo could afford the charge. And since the vessel operators had already succeeded in fending off a fee on the vessel (arguably the direct user of the channel) it came down to which ports and kinds of cargo had the most, or least, votes in Congress.

The “fairness” question was decided in favor of the greater number of ports, which were export oriented and/or whose channel maintenance costs might be expected to exceed channel fee collections in those harbors.

As was patently obvious the major international gateways would produce a substantial portion of the revenue. Indeed in 2005—yes, most HMTF data is musty stuff because the Federal government unreliably produces the mandated annual report—the top cargo value ports of LA (13.7%), NYNJ (12.2%) and Long Beach (12.2%) represented nearly $380 million, which was more than one-third of HMT receipts. The top ten ports by value handled over 68 percent.

Some of them, as it happens, also require little in the way of channel maintenance. (I’ll get more into that subject in a later post.)

The HMT and the HMTF are in ways unfair and they are imperfect by design. The value basis of the tax can be explained as a seaport maintenance policy crafted for nation where no seaport has the same cargo, cargo type, volumes or geography and whose Constitution forbids Congress giving “preference” to one port over another (Article 1, Section 9).

We can’t be so generous and understanding with the way the HMTF is crafted in law and managed in the budget process.

Changing the basis of the HMT is politically unlikely (see “snowball’s chance in Honolulu”). As for the HMTF, changing the law is not easy but it is doable. (To be continued.) Pbea

Time for a Maritime Title

In Intermodal, Marine Highway, MTS Policy, Surface Transportation Policy, Water Resources on January 30, 2012 at 1:16 am

In a few days we will see if there is a maritime title, or section, in what is traditionally the highway bill.  What’s that, you say?  You heard right.

Back in July 2011  House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee Chairman John Mica (R-FL) let us peek at the planned contents of the surface transportation bill that finally will get its debut in committee on February 2nd.

That summary, aptly named A New Direction, included a description of maritime transportation provisions, which would have as much symbolic as substantive significance for those of us working the water.  Including a few marine transportation provisions in the once-in-a-decade highway and transit legislation could prove to be a foot-in-the-door for more of the same when the next big surface bill comes along.  (Some of us impertinently suggest that marine transportation in fact is a surface mode…the wet one.)

But one can argue that the foot has been in the door for quite some time.  The passenger-oriented Ferry Boat Discretionary Program has been the lone marine transportation element in surface transportation policy and program since 1991 and the landmark ISTEA. Interestingly, the ferry program is managed by the Federal Highway Administration–a fact that some folks in the Maritime Administration probably still have difficulty acknowledging–because that is where the money is.

John Mica has for years talked about having a transportation “vision” that is intermodal, multimodal and makes greater use of the maritime.  The Chairman’s intentions revealed last year with regard to a maritime title included three basic objectives:

  • Ensure full use of the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund resources; only 60 percent of annual revenues are appropriated for channel maintenance.
  • Encourage  more maritime related activity including “short-sea shipping” by exempting cargo from the Harbor Maintenance Tax when moving between US ports.
  • Improve Corps of Engineer civil works project delivery.

This week the committee will meet to produce the bill.  There may be a maritime title with some placeholders to be added later.  Here’s what we see in our crystal ball:

  • The Corps project piece is not expected to be in the bill.  Such typical WRDA subject matter may be held back more as a matter of legislative strategy than anything.
  • Jurisdiction over the particular legislative remedy for the HMTF issue–contained in HR 104–is shared with the House Rules Committee where there is opposition to the so-called RAMP approach.  Appropriators are fighting it as well.  If RAMP isn’t included in the bill it won’t be for lack of trying by many stakeholders in the port navigation sector who have encouraged over 150 legislators to co-sponsor.
  • Maybe the topic that has the best chance of getting in the new maritime title is the HMT exemption for non-bulk cargo. But because the subject is within the jurisdiction of the Ways and Means Committee Mica’s transportation panel is expected to defer to the tax committee on bill language (likely to look like HR 1533).  So keep an eye on the Ways and Means hearing to occur this Wednesday. The HMT and HMTF issues will be heard and when that committee later meets to take up the transportation bill’s tax-related provisions we may find the HMT provision added.  (The subject of the vessel tonnage tax also is to be brought up at the Wednesday hearing.)

It looks like a maritime title will have, at best, a couple provisions. But if by the time the surface transportation measure goes to the House floor its 1000 or so pages include a maritime title–maybe only a wet highway provision to go with the dry highway ones–we should take a minute to savor a small provision and an encouraging direction for transportation policy.  Pbea

Make Time for Maritime Policy

In Federal Government, Marine Highway, MTS Policy on July 2, 2011 at 11:37 pm

The piece below appears in the June 2011 edition of the Eno Transportation Foundation newsletter, EnoBrief.  I appreciated the invitation to pen something on a maritime theme and decided to continue on the topic of American maritime policy, which is in need of attention.  Comments are welcome.  Pbea

“Now, what about our national maritime policy?” posed Norman Mineta in 2007, no longer Transportation Secretary, before answering himself. “Frankly, it is comparatively meager and unfocused.”

In his remarks to an industry finance audience he drew comparisons to the other modes that are more completely housed at USDOT, underpinned by substantial programs and funding, and enjoy large, strong and active stakeholder bases.

The former cabinet officer and present day Eno Board member’s prescriptions to address the sector’s ailments included things that might explain his waiting to address this “comparatively meager” sector only after he was out of office.

He said his recommendations can be accomplished “by overcoming the inevitable opposition – not only from without but from within.” He continued, “Within the maritime industry there are many agreements of mutual mediocrity.  People…will not want to see it changed.  The ground is shifting under their feet and they imperil needed financial investment and the innovation and the efficiencies it brings.”

He also mentioned some difficult issues that “need to be addressed within the industry” but “they are not reasons to oppose raising the importance of maritime issues on the national agenda.”

Secretary Mineta thought there was reason to issue an urgent call.  “Compared to the resources and focus that we have devoted to surface transportation and aviation, I believe we must quickly and dramatically increase our attention, our funding, and our national purpose with respect to maritime issues.  To fail is to become a second rate economic power with a decrease in our quality of life here at home and a reduced ability to effect change in international affairs.

“Simply put:  the United States must develop a comprehensive maritime policy and implement it through a thoroughly reorganized federal structure.” He said the public sector “must work with industry stakeholders to educate American citizens and their decision makers regarding U.S. reliance on a strong national maritime system.”

Four years later his concerns about maritime policy still deserve consideration.  And while Secretary Mineta’s remarks did not dwell on the issue of “ships and crews” the vessel aspect of present policy also warrants attention, especially if marine transportation is to play a role in addressing some of our nation’s transportation challenges.

The declining American flag presence in foreign commerce is being examined by the House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee, which prompted USDOT to commence a study, soon to be completed, to quantify the competitive disadvantage of American shipping.  Facing a competitor that flies flags of convenience, builds ships in China and Korea, and hires low wage crews the American operators will always find it tough to capture market share.

So let’s drill down to examine the protected American market. Not surprisingly, much of the Jones Act trade is carried in dry and liquid bulk vessels that lend themselves to commodities like grain and petroleum.  As for container shipping, the Jones Act fleet has only 26 vessels in service with a total carrying capacity of 56,631 TEU.  Most of those are in the Alaska, Hawaii and Puerto Rico trades. Sixty-eight percent of American container vessels (including barges) are at least 26 years old with 41 percent exceeding 30 years. (One can’t resist noting that a major program at the Maritime Administration is managing the disposal of U.S.-flag vessels.)

Meanwhile the capacity of U.S. commercial shipyards to build container and roll-on/roll-off ships is rapidly diminishing.  The Aker Philadelphia Shipyard is surviving for the moment on an emergency injection of State funds to build to ships on spec.  Aker, General Dynamics’s NASSCO Shipyard (CA) and Bay Shipbuilding (WI) announced layoffs last year. All 5,000 jobs at Northrup Grumman’s Avondale facility (LA)—a defense shipyard that could convert to commercial construction—are slated to end in 2011.

Why talk about U.S. container and ro/ro ship capacity?  Secretary Mineta, his successors at USDOT, and others have suggested that marine highway development is not only needed but inevitable for goods movement here.  The reasons include the mode’s inherent efficiency, its intermodal capabilities, public benefits to be derived from shifting part of the growing freight burden from land routes, and the extensive use of short sea and waterway service in other developed nations. Congress acknowledged as much by enacting the “short sea transportation” provisions of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007.

But to realize any of the above benefits—not to mention the renewal of a shrinking industry—these are needed: 1) a modern Jones Act fleet capable of meeting tough emissions standards effective in 2012, 2) cost-competitive commercial shipyard capacity to build the fleet, 3) vessel financing, 4) sufficient trained seamen and officers, and, let’s add, 5) a clear signal that Washington does not want America to lose its capacity to move goods on the water.

This telling is absent a call for or against Jones Act strictures. There are arguments for the status quo and for alteration.  But, as Secretary Mineta might say, the existence of the Jones Act in a world where cabotage requirements are commonplace is not reason “to oppose raising the importance of maritime issues on the national agenda” and reversing a decline in the American maritime sector.

“Now, what about our national maritime policy?”  

The Mineta Speech as a Starting Point

In Federal Government, MTS Policy, Surface Transportation Policy on March 30, 2011 at 11:34 pm

Former Secretary Norman Mineta provided a service in making his 2007 speech on the maritime sector (excerpts found starting here).  Since he went to the trouble, let’s use his suggestions as a starting point for an overdue discussion on rethinking and recharging US maritime policy.

Secretary Mineta called for moving maritime related functions of other agencies to the  Maritime Administration and renaming the agency according to the “Federal [ ] Administration” template used for the other modes.  There are 18 or so departments and agencies with program interest in marine transportation including USDA, NOAA, EPA and the Navy.  Reason enough to create an interagency Committee on the Marine Transportation System (CMTS).  Perhaps some functions could be consolidated in USDOT.  Others not so easily.  The navigation portion of the USACE civil works program, one that often is mentioned as a prospect, may not transfer well.  Not that the status quo is worth maintaining.  The excruciatingly-slow project evaluation and preparation process has ports pulling out their metaphorical hair.  But it’s not simply a Corps of Engineers process failing but one that Congress abets by being very unreliable in implementing the key stages of project authorization and funding.   The channel program is ripe for change.  But it is not a given that USDOT is the best place for it.  For that matter, program consolidation can cause problems as much as fix others.

The former Secretary suggests that MARAD must shift its focus to the condition of the nation’s ports and away from its long attention to “ships and crews.”  Actually that shift started during the Clinton Administration under Secretary Federico Pena.  He gave attention to port issues (including the dredging process) and MARAD has done all it can to grow its portfolio in this direction.  The agency has functioned as project manager for federally funded port projects in Alaska, Hawaii, Guam and elsewhere. (Mostly with DOD money.)  The 111th Congress authorized MARAD to manage such “port infrastructure projects”as money is made available.

I disagree with Mr. Mineta that there is too much focus on ships.  As long as there is a US flag requirement (see Jones Act), a diminishing shipyard industry and capability, and a US merchant fleet that is a shadow of its former self someone should pay it attention.  Clearly current law and policy isn’t getting the job done.  For that matter, I can’t recall a modern administration of either party that has cared much about cargo moving on US flag vessels.  (No, I won’t go back as far as Roosevelt.)

The suggestion also is made to rename the US Merchant Marine Academy and “give it our time and attention.” Reports issued during the Bush and Obama administrations, including one called “Red Sky in the Morning,” made clear that oversight and investment had been lacking at King’s Point.  So a turnaround effort continues today with Kings Point being .  But let’s face it.  Why bother making it a top notch maritime academy if the effort isn’t being made to grow the anemic maritime sector?  It would be nice if the young men and women who want a career in the merchant marine can actually find good paying jobs there.

Secretary Mineta suggested that if “ports and waterways funding is always being relegated to parts of the surface transportation bill, or the defense bill, they will remain second-class subjects…” He is saying that the sector needs, in effect, a SEA-21 much as there were TEA-21 and AIR-21—the highway and aviation authorization bills of the 1990s.  A dedicated maritime bill to advance maritime policy and related projects.  I think a maritime bill is in order, especially for addressing failings of current policy and the paucity of programs tuned to today.  But as long as Washington continues to think in terms of modal stovepipes the marine stovepipe will remain offshore and remote from the “surface” modes, system development and corridor planning where intermodal policy, transportation solutions, and major projects tend to be reserved for road and rail.

Marine transportation related provisions belong in an intermodal, multimodal surface–wet and dry surface, if you will–transportation  bill.

More on this subject to come.  Comments welcome.   Pbea

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