Marine Transportation System

Posts Tagged ‘change’

Still a Compelling Alternative

In Efficiency, Energy/Environ, Green Transportation, MTS Policy, Vessels on April 19, 2016 at 10:56 pm

Rendering of TOTE LNG Propulsion (NASSCO)

One can imagine the LNG pioneers – TOTE, Crowley, and Harvey Gulf Marine – looking over their shoulders and asking, “where is everybody?”

Others might wonder if LNG is losing its luster. If it will ever achieve its potential to become a dominant marine and transportation fuel.

Before we start hanging black crepe, let’s not lose sight of the ample evidence that LNG remains a compelling alternative to meet growing emissions requirements.

Interest in LNG as a marine fuel was initially driven by three factors: Emissions Control Areas (ECAs) in North America and Northern Europe; the rapid growth of natural gas production; and LNG’s potential to significantly reduce all categories of marine air emissions, particularly sulfur oxide. LNG was predicted to displace a significant portion of the marine fuel market by the end of the decade with forecasts of 30 percent market penetration by 2030. This development then likely would spur broader adoption of LNG and CNG by other transportation modes.

The optimism, however, was tempered by the challenges encountered by the first adopters. These challenges were not a matter of technology. Rather, first adopters encountered a lack of regulatory structures and existing market relationships. It would require creating entirely new market relationships, and logistics, distribution and fueling infrastructures.

These challenges persist, particularly in the United States, where infrastructure development remains tied to specific vessel projects. Unlike in other countries, here there are no national policies or programs to foster and promote LNG development. There has been no credible signal from the gas supply industry that the fueling infrastructure will be built absent assured demand. With the exception of Tacoma and Jacksonville, which are tied to specific vessel projects, no major US port has stepped forward to actively promote and facilitate the construction of LNG terminals or to partner with gas suppliers to construct distribution facilities.

The major Jones Act ocean carriers have new build programs underway. In large part, the Jones Act blue water market potential for LNG has been realized but little progress is seen elsewhere. Ferry operators in New York and Washington State have signaled intent to incorporate LNG in their new vessel plans. The inland waterways fleet has seen no significant movement in that direction. In contrast, the 2012 EU Master Plan calls for the entire inland system to be LNG-capable. Considerable effort is also underway to develop harmonized standards and regulations across national boundaries. Conversion of the fleet has begun.

There is a phrase: “Money talks…” and if that is indeed the case, then the continuing investment in LNG vessels and infrastructure around the world is clear evidence that the migration continues elsewhere. The EU has not altered its formal commitment to support LNG-related projects despite economic difficulties and the drop in oil prices. New projects continue to be funded.

At least four LNG bunkering vessels will be operating in the United States and Europe by the end of 2016 and DNV GL estimates that 73 LNG fueled vessels are operating today, with another 80 on order. Upwards of 600 vessels could be operating worldwide by 2020. While this is only a small percentage of the global fleet, it represents significant financial investments by shipowners who clearly believe that LNG will be available to fuel these vessels at prices below the projected costs of MGO.

So there are silver linings on the LNG horizon, and I am convinced the real breakthrough for LNG will come when the major liner companies incorporate LNG as a standard element in their newbuild plans. A decision by any of the major ocean carriers to install either full LNG capability in their new generations of vessels, or, in a hedging strategy, install dual fuel engines with the intent to move to full LNG at a later date, would provide a strong impetus for the expansion of LNG globally. But this has not happened on a large scale for reasons that may be related to oil prices but also to concerns about the availability of LNG in their ports of call and uncertainty related to the 2018 IMO Annex VI consideration.

I believe that this challenge must be approached in a different way by moving forward with infrastructure development without a firm commitment from a shipping company. If LNG infrastructure proceeds first in one of the major load ports in the United States, it would be a powerful signal to the major liner companies that fuel will be available and would likely incentivize ship owners to accelerate the move to LNG.

If one accepts the “inevitability” of LNG, which I believe is a reasonable proposition, it would seem prudent for ports and gas suppliers to move forward to build the necessary infrastructure in the absence of a guaranteed offtake commitment. Clearly there are risks in this approach. Perhaps it is too much to ask ports and gas suppliers to assume this risk in the current investment climate, particularly for public companies. It is far easier to gain approval for a large investment if there is a guaranteed customer. But risk is intrinsic to life and business, and the key is how risks are managed and mitigated, particularly when the upside potential for the gas industry and ports is so great.

Something has to break the continuing “chicken and egg” impasse and energize the slow and somewhat sporadic development of marine LNG in the U.S. If there is broad consensus that LNG is a net positive, then it seems we need to approach this market opportunity in a way that does not fit traditional investment analyses.

One risk that must be addressed is the 2018 IMO global fuel sulfur decision. Global fuel sulfur standards are scheduled to be reduced to 0.5 percent in 2020 from the current 3.5 percent. As written, MARPOL Annex VI gives the IMO only two choices: either affirm the 2020 standard or delay it until 2025, and the basis for the decision is the worldwide availability of MGO and other “relevant” factors.

I strongly believe the IMO should affirm the existing 0.5 percent standard. If this is not possible, I would propose that the IMO implement an interim standard of 1.0 percent in 2020 with the more stringent standard delayed until a later date. Such an approach would essentially mirror the ECA implementation that resulted in LNG moving from a novelty conversation to a serious alternative compliance strategy in the United States and Europe.

This single act would create a powerful regulatory incentive to spur development of LNG infrastructure and vessel construction and provide the impetus to the international liner companies to adopt LNG in their next generation of vessels for delivery by 2020. Therefore, if the ports and gas supply industries have already begun the process of site selection, permitting and possibly construction by 2018, it would serve a dual purpose of undermining arguments that LNG is not a viable replacement fuel for lack of distribution infrastructure..

Yogi Berra was right when he said: “It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future.” It is certainly true about LNG as a marine fuel. But as a longtime member of the maritime industry and proponent of LNG as a fuel I believe that this year LNG will continue its inexorable growth as the most effective way to meet the increasing environmental requirements our industry is facing.   John Graykowski

Rx: Port Decongestant

In Competition, Government, Port Performance, Ports on April 14, 2016 at 1:14 am

The Secretary of Commerce received recommendations from her department’s Advisory Committee on Supply Chain Competitiveness (ACSCC). The paper: Recommendations to the Secretary of Commerce Regarding US Seaport and Connecting Infrastructure Congestion “for addressing and resolving” the “urgent national topic” of port congestion.

(From the humble perspective of a long time ports advocate in Washington, DC, home of the ten-ring circus, it is gratifying and reassuring that ports can sometimes make it to the spotlight and, even more, qualify as an urgent national topic…whether to the Commerce Secretary or to anyone. Not a bad career choice after all.)

Federal leadership is needed to advance a set of best port congestion reduction practices that the private and public owners and stakeholders of each port can individually adopt as appropriate. Our report contains a number of congestion reduction practices for this purpose. By advancing these practices, the Nation can achieve a comprehensive, holistic reduction in port congestion that improves national competitiveness and economic growth.

The February 4, 2016 transmittal letter to Secretary Penny Pritzker also noted that there is a limit to the role that Washington can play in addressing the issue but wanted to make the most of that role.

However, where Federal Government involvement can directly resolve port congestion issues, or reduce their impacts, Federal action should be swift and decisive.

The nine-page paper was drafted, discussed, and edited by the panel — a formal Federal Advisory Committee — over a good part of the previous year and then was approved at its January meeting. The folks who led the initiative are knowledgeable in freight logistics. And if certain others of the 30 to 40 persons usually present for the meetings had little personal knowledge of what happens in the life of an ocean shipping container it was explained to them.

(This is a good time to note that one sector that did not have a seat at that table is one that could have contributed greatly to the panel’s understanding of port terminal operations — the marine terminal industry. Further note: the newly selected class of ACSCC appointees to the 44 member advisory committee continues the seeming exclusion of representatives of the terminal industry.)

Port congestion, as it has come to be called, is a problem only in a few of the larger US ports but as those international gateways — New York/New Jersey, Los Angeles, Long Beach, Oakland, Virginia — handle a substantial share of the nation’s cargo, especially imports, slowed cargo throughput is a problem and can be costly to cargo interests and others involved in the port-centered supply chain. It is not that the other ports will never see port congestion. Others likely will, eventually. But even as this “urgent national” port topic has become an issue in Washington, and attracting the attention of multiple Federal agencies, most ports have seen none of the symptoms and few of the causes, of which there are many.

Simplistically, it might be compared to growing pains. Changes are happening to the port, terminal and other elements of the port-centered supply chain. Some of their moving parts are not moving as well as they had been. Cargo volumes are shifting. Shippers are diversifying ports of entry. Larger vessels mean more cargo to load or unload during one vessel call. Terminals were configured for the business of ten years ago. Ocean carriers relinquished ownership of chassis but not full control. A chassis or container depot is not convenient to the terminal. The truck driver makes multiple trips for one load. Drivers are told to to pick up the container when there might be better times to do it. Trucks spend hours in lines, sometimes needlessly. Discouraged drivers exit the business, causing shortages. Roads to the terminal are inadequate for the truck volume. Rail capacity is insufficient. Berths may work around the clock but gates do not because the container is destined for a warehouse not open until eight in the morning.

Throw in some sort of labor dispute (slowdown, etc) or a failure of the computerized terminal operating system and a combination of these factors can make for a quite a mess. The 2014-2015 West Coast experience during protracted labor contract negotiations — with two dozen and more ships at anchor offshore as evidence of the problem onshore — remains vivid in the minds of many whose cargo was slow to get to market and, in the case of farm exports, spoiled. The experience also is a vivid memory for  the people who worked to clear the ships and terminals of containers.

So, yes, there is a problem that some ports have been working to address. Indeed in those named ports multidisciplinary groups were organized to identify and tackle those problems. The first of those was the NY/NJ Port Performance Task Force, which for the implementation phase was succeeded by the Council on Port Performance.

The 2016 recommendations to Secretary Pritzker do not stand alone. In 2014, the Federal Maritime Commission heard stakeholders during four regional listening sessions, and later issued staff reports. The FMC is about to launch what may be its last initiative — Supply Chain Innovation Teams to “develop commercial solutions to supply chain challenges and related port congestion concerns” at the San Pedro Bay ports. In March of this year, the cabinet secretaries of Commerce, Labor and Transportation hosted an invitation-only, “21st century seaports roundtable” that was organized by the White House’s National Economic Council. Bills were introduced on Capitol Hill in 2015 and one — the Port Performance Act — eventually became law. The Department of Transportation’s Bureau of Transportation Statistics is now working on implementing the resulting Port Performance Freight Statistics Program. All of which can reasonably be attributed to the lobbying of cargo interests, with the help of trucking, who smarted from the West Coast port mess and wanted to see improvements that included, but not were limited to, workforce issues.

Committee members noted, during the discussion of this Report, that these measures can be used by the ACSCC to help the U.S. Department of Transportation to develop the set of port performance metrics required by the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act. The Committee also encourages the U.S. Congress to consider additional investment in last-mile infrastructure, new technologies and intelligent systems, and on-dock and near-dock facilities towards reducing U.S. port congestion.

The recommendations of “best practices” delivered to Secretary Pritzker, the details of which you can read here, apply to ocean carriers; terminal operations; port authorities; Federal, State and local government; chassis equipment management; motor carriers; and transportation planners. It is interesting to note that the recommendations apply to just about everyone in the port-related supply chain except the importers and exporters who, as happens, were the principal writers and proponents of the document.

One might wonder if others in the supply chain would have “best practices” to suggest to that shipper community. I think they would.

The Port Performance Task Force report engaged representatives of stakeholders from most aspects of the supply chain and came up with twenty-three recommendations to try to implement. Some of those recommendations, perhaps many, are true challenges, asking competing parties to cooperate in establishing shared solutions such as a truck management system (a.k.a. “appointments”) and chassis pools. Most of the recommendations have little to do with Federal or State government and much to do with improving commercial relationships, embracing new technology, sharing information, adjusting operations, improving communications, and respecting a negotiated labor contract. A few of those are in the recommendations to the Secretary.

The interest of Federal agencies in the port congestion issue is not a bad thing but it is misleading to label it “port congestion.” It is a supply chain problem. Why did the advisory committee recommendations go to the Secretary of Commerce? I suppose the reason is — like the banks to Willie Sutton — because she is there, and the panel exists to advise the Secretary. But as the transmittal letter admits, there is not much that the government can do. Outside of facilitating meetings and providing some assistance in funding infrastructure projects, the lion’s share of the work to be done is there in the supply chain, by the parties that make up the supply chain…and not just at the marine terminal.   Pbea

Uncertain Future for Marine LNG

In Energy/Environ, Environment on December 14, 2015 at 12:48 am

We welcome a new post by John Graykowski on the subject of LNG as a marine fuel. He describes this period as a “crossroads moment” requiring parties to hold fast to the original timeframe for vessel emissions reductions as set by the IMO in MARPOL Annex VI.

Despite many indications that LNG is gaining acceptance as a marine and transportation fuel, ship owners still appear reluctant to fully embrace the new fuel. Many owners are hedging their bets by installing dual fuel engines and other LNG-specific features on their new vessels, but delaying the installation of the fuel tank and fuel gas system until some later date. Others are placing new build orders with conventional propulsion systems, effectively dismissing LNG as a credible alternative.

Since stringent worldwide limits on fuel sulfur content are scheduled to become effective in 2020, these decisions might seem questionable. A provision in MARPOL Annex VI, however, creates significant uncertainty whether the IMO will in fact hold to this schedule, thus allowing some operators to make a strategic calculation that the limits will be delayed.

Adopted in 2008, Annex VI created a two tiered regulatory structure to phase in fuel sulfur requirements. For those states that implemented emissions control areas (ECAs), fuel sulfur limits were reduced in two stages from 1.5% to 1% in 2012 with a final reduction in January 2015 to 0.1%. Outside the ECAs, the current 3.5% limit is scheduled to be reduced to 0.5% in 2020. However, this will happen only after a mandatory 2018 IMO review which must find that sufficient compliant fuel will be available in 2020; otherwise the limit will remain at 3.5% until 2025.

At that time, there were only two “viable” compliance options for ship owners: use marine gas oil (MGO) or install exhaust gas scrubbers. The natural gas “revolution” was in its infancy and there was little, if any, discussion of LNG as a cleaner and more economical alternative to either MGO or scrubbers. Despite giving fuel suppliers over a decade of advance notice to prepare, the potential magnitude of demand for compliant fuel and concerns that MGO production would be insufficient led the IMO to create this 2018 “gate” before the 0.5% limit would become effective.

A fortuitous confluence of factors led to the emergence of LNG as an alternative marine fuel. The ECAs created unambiguous regulatory imperatives and hard deadlines; the unforeseen increase in worldwide gas production led to a steep decline in prices; and there were no technological barriers to the use of LNG as a propulsion fuel. MGO and scrubbers involve significant expense, provide less comprehensive emissions reductions, and, in the case of scrubbers, increased risk, In contrast, LNG offers compliance with sulfur limits, significant improvements across the entire spectrum of emissions and long term cost advantages. Even with the current drop in oil prices, LNG is projected to maintain its economic and environmental advantages for many years to come. The ECAs made it possible for the first adopters to move forward in the U.S.; the EU to propound a formal policy to support LNG deployment throughout Europe; and Norway to emerge as a dominant player in the marine LNG world.

Experience in the ECAs has demonstrated that concerns about fuel availability are largely unfounded, and that the fuel supply industry can and will respond to demand signals, particularly those driven by clear regulatory requirements and deadlines. The phased approach in the ECAs allowed fuel suppliers and operators to first adjust to the 1% standard and then to prepare for the lower limits in 2015 and resulted in a smooth transition to MGO earlier this year with no apparent supply shortages. This approach had another important impact on marine operators in the ECAs who began looking at LNG as a credible alternative to either MGO or scrubbers.

The Annex VI review provision allows the IMO to consider “other relevant issues” and thus offers the means to include LNG in the analysis of fuel availability. LNG adoption that has already occurred is directly related to the implementation of the ECAs with their interim steps and fixed deadlines. The IMO should emulate this approach by requiring global fuel sulfur limits to be reduced to 1% in 2020 with a permanent reduction to 0.5% in 2025. The ECA experiences and the growth of LNG as a marine fuel provide ample justification to support this decision, rather than simply allowing the 3.5% limit to remain in place.

By 2018, more than 150 vessels worldwide will be using LNG as a fuel; the EU will have bunkering capabilities in several of its major ports; LNG powered ships will be operating in the US; China will be well on its way to transforming its inland fleet to LNG, and Singapore and Korea will be in the midst of building LNG bunkering infrastructure. The adoption of an interim 1% standard would likely galvanize the world shipping community to accelerate the movement to LNG when new vessels are ordered. In turn, this would be an unequivocal signal to the gas supply industries to move forward with infrastructure development, thus banishing forever the chicken and egg cliché in connection with LNG development.

This is a crossroads moment for the IMO and it can make a clear, definitive, and compelling statement to advance environmental quality and affirm its commitment to continued reductions. The US, Canada, and the EU made the hard political decisions to implement stringent marine emissions standards, and the markets have adjusted. As 2018 approaches, the IMO will be under increasing scrutiny from many parties, including those with a vested interest in LNG development. I would urge those nations that have implemented ECAs, or are contemplating them, those that have enacted formal policies to encourage the development of LNG as a marine fuel, and the natural gas suppliers and the environmental communities –admittedly a somewhat nontraditional alliance – to insist that the IMO adopt this phased approach.

Anything less would be a lost opportunity to take a giant step forward in the effort to reduce marine air emissions, and likely would slow the pace of LNG adoption for another five years.   John Graykowski

New Congress. New Maritime Policy?

In Congress, Leadership, MTS Policy, Politics on November 15, 2014 at 3:30 pm

As the first draft of this piece was being put to page some small percentage of voters were practicing their citizenship at the polls. The prospects for the Democrats, as a whole, were not very good. Ten days later, and as I now refine this text, the field still is being cleared of Election Day debris. Not just the sloppily pinned signs on the road medians but prognosticators’ tattered reputations and a few shattered incumbents were strewn on the political landscape in need of reclaiming. By far more than the paid pollsters divined in the weeks before November 4, the Republicans were handed the reins in Congress and a number of State Houses. The party consolidated its control of the House and leapt into the majority in the Senate with at least 53 seats and a net gain of eight. The final count awaits a December conclusion in Louisiana where GOP prospects in the run-off are good.

Public dissatisfaction with government in Washington is close to universal but for reasons I will leave to others to explain the Republican Party benefited substantially more than its competition and that will keep them in power, especially at state level, for several years to come. As if speaking for his fellow Republicans across the country re-elected Gov. Sandoval (R-NV) said, “This is a night to savor.”

By the numbers, incumbent US Senate Republicans will be vulnerable in 2016…but let’s not get ahead of ourselves. The matter before us is the next two years of the 114th Congress.

This week the rank and file of both parties in both chambers opted to retain current leadership. Soon we will learn the names to inhabit chairmanships, ranking minority posts, and committee lists. Meanwhile, in the current lame duck session the legislature is expected produce appropriations to keep the government functioning through the fiscal year. They will decide whether the Keystone XL pipeline project should be started, and take up a few other must-pass items before bringing the 113th Congress to a close.

Long before Election Day the US-flag maritime community nervously eyed voter surveys because of what a possible Republican return to power in the Senate could mean. Now, the controlling party is known; how that majority will be reflected in maritime related legislation will be something to watch.

One can easily find Republican legislators who are considered friends of the US maritime industry, whether driven by interest in US-flag cargo preference policy, shipyard activity, the labor force, other sectors that benefit by existing policy, or just a sense of what a nation should say about its maritime capability, security, etc. But that doesn’t mean that the maritime community in Washington, DC was sanguine or unconcerned about the prospect of the GOP taking the lead in producing legislation. In fact, unions, shipyards, US flag operators and others with a stake in the status quo were in varying degrees of pre-election anxiety.

The community has been frustrated with the Obama Administration’s willingness to ease cargo preference requirements. Now, potentially as problematic, Republican legislators who, for philosophical or constituency reasons, have not been inclined to extend Ex-Im Bank authorization or fund cargo preference policy—both key issues for the US merchant marine—will have more influence in policy setting. Add to that the fact that congressional support for the Jones Act is lacking in some quarters where the marketplace is revered and shipper interests—including domestic petroleum producers—would exchange the US flag for lower vessel costs. Some ports hit hard by disruptive events and who need short term Jones Act waivers in order to manage logistics crises, may find some more receptive offices.

A few years ago Jones Act and US-flag interests started Maritime Industry Congressional Sail-In Day to lobby the Hill with a particular aim to educate legislators who are new to maritime issues. The old guard–those who recall there once was a House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, soon 20 years defunct—are nearly gone from Congress as a consequence of natural and electoral attrition. (The American maritime sector has suffered from attrition as well, with a reduced presence in international shipping and, in some respects, an aging Jones Act sector.)

More recent Republican additions to Capitol Hill are a decidedly more conservative population—some of them Libertarians and self-identified tea partiers—who are more market- and less government-oriented. They arrive in Washington with little knowledge of the American maritime tradition and even less of its policy and the rationale behind that policy. They read material from policy critics and, presumably, its advocates.

On the Senate Commerce, Science & Transportation Committee are Marco Rubio (R-FL), Ted Cruz (R-TX) and Ron Johnson (R-WI) who, for example, have opposed reauthorizing the Ex-Im Bank (“corporate welfare”) and could be in the mix to chair the subcommittee with jurisdiction over maritime policy. Veteran John McCain (R-AZ), the likely next chair of the Armed Services Committee, has a record of proposing the repeal of the Jones Act. Referring to a McCain quote in a Wall Street Journal blog, a union newsletter carries this heading: “Sen. John McCain Calls Jones Act’s National Security Benefits Laughable.”

Maybe change is coming, maybe not.  If anything, there is a good chance we will see more jousting on US maritime policy.   Pbea

Europe is Breaking the Egg

In Efficiency, Energy/Environ, Infrastructure, MTS Policy, Ports on October 5, 2014 at 11:16 pm

Before we get to John Graykowski’s “Europe is Breaking the Egg” I would like to pose my own chicken-and-the-egg question as one might ask it here in Wonkington, D.C. Which comes first: the policy or the strategy? One might also ponder how good is a forward looking strategy when the policy is of the past century. The Maritime Administration is preparing a “National Maritime Strategy.” It is a principal objective of Administrator Chip Jaenichen and probably has been encouraged by congressional supporters of the U.S. flag industry who, like most of us, have not liked seeing the merchant fleet decline but who, unlike us, are in a position to redefine U.S. maritime policy. The piece below begs the question whether a new national maritime strategy would benefit by first fixing the national maritime policy that for the most part has been in place while the United States lost its prominent role in world shipping. Certainly it would make it easier on Mr. Jaenichen and the Secretary of Transportation to have an updated national policy framework as a basis for new strategies to get to where we need to be. John Graykowski’s article first appeared in Pacific Maritime Magazine on September 1, 2014. You can find it here. He poses the policy question in the context of a growing American supply of natural gas and the multiple benefits to be realized by fostering a bunker switch to LNG. This is the third in his series for MTS Matters on the subject of developing LNG distribution infrastructure to advance the adoption of LNG as a marine fuel. It also is a recurring theme in these pages.  Pbea

We may soon be able to retire the tiresome “chicken and egg” cliché to describe LNG development, since there has been movement in the last year in Europe and the United States that indicates the circle may be breaking; but it’s too soon to tell whether the movement is temporary or permanent. What is apparent, however, it that Europe has moved forward in a more focused and strategic way, to create LNG infrastructure and markets, which is yielding results. By 2016, permanent LNG bunkering facilities will be in operation in Rotterdam and Antwerp – both among the largest ports in the world – thereby signaling that the supply uncertainties have been resolved. It bears asking, therefore, how Europe has done this, and whether we should consider similar measures here if the goal is to expand LNG as a marine and transportation fuel throughout the United States.

In 2008, Norway effectively made LNG the preferred fuel choice for marine operators through a combination of regulatory mandates relating to Nitrogen Oxide (NOx) and financial incentives covering up to 80 percent of the capital cost of the LNG-related components. Following these actions, the number of Norwegian vessels using LNG as a primary fuel went from 3 to 12 vessels in five years, with more than 50 vessels of various types now under construction along with the supporting LNG infrastructure. Concurrent with this, Norway is addressing the regulatory and operational issues, and is now seen as a leader in marine LNG development.

The European Union (EU) is also pursuing a comprehensive effort to increase LNG as a marine fuel with the goal of developing LNG infrastructure in every major seaport by 2020, and every inland terminal by 2025; a total of 139 ports across Europe. This goal coincides with estimates that by 2020, 1,700 dual fuel vessels will be built or converted worldwide, with many of these operating in, or calling on, the EU.

By 2020, the United Arab Shipping Corporation (USAC) dual fuel container vessels will be operating between the Far East and Europe. This activity will spawn additional interest and movement in Europe and among its global trading partners leading to a rapid transition from diesel to LNG as a major transportation fuel.

The EU is employing a “carrot and stick” approach combining financial support for the conversion and construction of vessels and infrastructure with increased regulation. Projects such as the Trans-European Network for Transport (Ten-T) and the Rhine-Main-Danube initiatives have produced significant results. $139 million has already been allocated to 7 Ten-T projects to support vessel conversion and LNG infrastructure development, with more funding promised. Support of up to 50 percent of project costs is available for vessel conversion, construction and infrastructure, and just recently the first inland dual fuel barge was delivered and will shortly begin operations.

The EU adopted an approach that combines: (1) clear and defined goals that LNG will displace traditional marine fuels; (2) increased environmental regulations; (3) financial incentives to spur the initial transition; and (4) coordination among ports, governments; regulatory agencies and stakeholders to create uniform regulatory structures. Given the intrinsic advantages of LNG, there is recognition that the market would likely drive toward greater adoption of LNG without assistance. However, many vessel owners and gas suppliers are reluctant to be the first to make the investments in LNG vessels and infrastructure regardless of the advantages. The EU has determined that these measures are necessary in order to reduce perceived risks, accelerate market decisions, and attain the stated goals for LNG deployment.

In contrast, the United States does not have a national policy to support LNG as a marine and transportation fuel. Instead, our LNG market is developing project-by-project, driven by first-adopters such as Harvey Gulf, Tote, Matson, and Crowley with no federal support or strategy; despite the tremendous benefits LNG offers to the country. While we have seen some movement in disparate locations, there is not so much as a policy statement that commits this country to the development of LNG as a transportation fuel; and there are certainly no programs to support the construction of vessels and infrastructure to make this possible nor to address regulatory uncertainties and enhance public acceptance of LNG.

The challenges and obstacles that exist here are no different from those in Europe, and LNG is new to everyone. It appears, however, that the EU has tackled this question in a more coherent, direct, and proactive way that is rapidly producing results. To be sure, there are major differences between the US and the EU in terms of governmental structures and processes. The EU can promulgate Europe-wide regulations and implement promotional programs, and has a history of doing so. Here, that role would be shared between Congress and the Executive Branch, and that is yet another challenge given the continuing dysfunction between both branches of government.

A policy declaring that LNG as a transportation fuel is in the national interest, and committing to the support, promotion and encouragement of its development would have several immediate effects:

  • It would be a clear signal to all potential stakeholders that LNG is “real” and has the backing of Congress and Administration;
  • It would put federal agencies on notice – and could require them– to collaborate with industry on practical and uniform regulation, reduced delays and greater certainty; and
  • It could include limited and temporary financial incentives such as loan guarantees or tax incentives to accelerate LNG conversion, because early adopters should be encouraged in order to build a sustaining market that benefits the entire country.

Federal resources are constrained, but without a national commitment, LNG may not gain the critical mass and momentum to create a long-term viable market. Regulatory direction is important, and does not involve direct costs, but if combined with properly structured and managed loan guarantees or tax incentives they would have a greater likelihood of jump-starting this industry at low risk and large benefit to the whole nation in emissions reductions, energy independence, economic activity in shipyards and elsewhere. The promise of LNG is so great it deserves this sort of recognition, attention, and effort. Clearly the EU sees it that way, and we should as well and the risk if we don’t address it in this way is diminished potential for LNG to transform this country and the lost opportunity to lead the world in LNG development and utilization.   John Graykowski

A Perspective on Port Dominoes

In Competition, Efficiency, Intermodal, Ports on October 3, 2014 at 12:52 am

A few days ago over 100 people packed a room at high up in Baltimore’s World Trade Center for a day-long forum on “port congestion” convened by the Federal Maritime Commission. It was the second of four planned public meetings–the first was in Los Angeles and the next two will occur in New Orleans and Charleston. The window views from the meeting venues will not be the only differences in what is observed at the four sessions but there are bound to be things in common, too.

The subject of congestion means different things depending on where you are. The severity of the problem also depends on when the post-Panamax ships will arrive in greater numbers to the Gulf and on the East Coast.

The Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach qualify as Congestion Central if only as a matter of volume and a PierPass system that is working only too well. Some of what they are experiencing could be visited upon the Port of New York/New Jersey in less two years’ time when the Panama Canal gives way to the big ships and if certain problems are not fixed by that time. But that does not mean New York Harbor isn’t experiencing head-throbbing congestion today. Name the problem or snafu and the bistate port has experienced it like punches to the gut. So much so that it did not take much convincing to get terminals, truckers, shippers, labor, carriers and others in the room and agree to hold hands and embark on a waterfront version of a 12-step program.

Norfolk may have 50-feet of water to suit, first, colliers and now big box ships but it also is scrambling to have infrastructure and systems ready in a couple years. Truck and terminal-related problems prompted Norfolk’s own come-to-jesus/how-can-we-fix-this? process. Like other ports the problem is more on land than in the water. The concern isn’t about ships scraping bottom but about terminals getting stuck without a chassis or with too many ships and too little in the way of equipment, labor, trucks or gates. It helps that the Vice President brought a $15 million TIGER grant to Norfolk last week to help pay for improvements to gates and last-mile infrastructure over the next few years.

In the South Atlantic the stories and problems will sound a bit different, as they will in the Gulf. Ports there undoubtedly will paint favorable comparisons to their troubled brethren to the north in a sort of Alfred E. Newman way–“What, me congested?”–and not without reason. But there the trucking and chassis management problems may be only in early stages of development and more of the big ships (and perhaps big-ship-challenges) may be in their future. In fact they are counting on it.

A perspective on the problems facing terminals recently appeared in the Journal of Commerce. The opinion piece by John Crowley, Executive Director of the National Association of Waterfront Employers (NAWE, a client) was cited at the FMC forum by Bill Shea, CEO of Direct ChassisLink (DCLI) in its enumeration of congestion-inducing factors that are in play to one extent or another at U.S. container ports. Crowley pointed to 12 factors including the bunching of ship arrivals, larger ships and cargo discharges, local traffic congestion, terminal capacity and gate hours, truck driver decisions, labor shortages, and even severe weather such as has been seen in the Gulf and more recently from Superstorm Sandy. Most of those were mentioned by speakers at the Baltimore session this week.

Crowley’s piece speaks to the fact that the symptoms of what is being called port congestion are seen throughout much of the intermodal supply chain, which is to say, not just right there at the marine terminal. “The intermodal freight system…consists of market-based industry segments. There are pressures aimed at making each segment more operationally efficient and increasingly productive. It’s a system of nonstop competition, hypersensitive economics and narrow margins. We see it in the increasing size of container ships, the investments made in marine terminal technology and capacity,” etc. “The market determines demands on price and service levels from the modal carriers which, in turn is felt throughout the supply chain and by all modal carriers. Situated in the midst of those demands are marine terminals that strive for each modal operation – marine, rail and truck – to be roughly in sync.”

John Crowley “encourages all industry sectors to collaborate, as much as practicable and permissible under law, to arrive at solutions that will serve their mutual interests… Our operators rely on each mode to similarly commit. Solutions may not come as easily and swiftly as we all would like, but they will have to come about through adaptation in the marketplace by the principal actors in the intermodal freight system…” He calls for government policies that foster market solutions where possible. “We welcome positive and appropriate federal involvement that contributes to solutions but will resist unproductive, regulatory intrusions into terminal operations and where even well-intended government involvement will only frustrate the development of market solutions.” Find the full piece here.

Those views were also heard by the folks in the crowded 21st floor meeting room in Baltimore.  The Port Authority of New York & New Jersey’s Rick Larrabee described one of the guiding principals in the formation of the Port Performance Task Force 10 months ago. The port’s stakeholders had to be willing to “look inside” for answers as much to look to others in the port to fix the problems. Few of those problems stand alone. A line of dominoes is not the perfect metaphor but it will do. The trucker’s dilemma, for example, is one that is felt and affected by other actors in the supply chain. The companies and drivers have something to contribute but without changes in other sectors the drayage problems will become more severe; the congestion will worsen.

Dire predictions underscored the calls for solutions.

Collective efforts formed to tackle problems in the ports of San Pedro Bay, New York Harbor and Hampton Roads and as a result there is reason for optimism. But as several people told the FMC commissioners this week, we will have a rough year or two, starting this winter, until those solutions are implemented by the principal actors in the port marketplace.

Meanwhile, the FMC will hold its forums. The commissioners and staff are taking notes and those will emerge in some form of a report. It is good for the government to be alert to what is going on at the nation’s gateways and the problems of the freight logistics system. That agency may even decide to take some action to the extent its limited jurisdiction allows. But it is up to the chassis, terminal, truck, ship, rail and distribution center operators and the beneficial cargo owners ultimately to figure out how to make things work better.   Pbea


Congress Got It Done

In Congress, Government, Infrastructure, Legislation, Ports, Water Resources on May 23, 2014 at 1:13 pm

While strolling through the park one day
In the merry merry month of May
I was taken by surprise…

Two recent May events are fresh in mind. Maybe not of the surprising sort but perhaps, eventually, capable of the unexpected. On May 6th the Maritime Administration convened its second symposium aimed in the direction of a National Maritime Strategy. And just this week, Congress gave final approval to the first water resources development act legislation enacted in seven years. Both have significance to the maritime sector but, for the time being, we may be able to gauge the significance of just the one.

So, let’s talk WRDA…rather, WRRDA.

You don’t have to have inside-the-beltway know-how to know what “werda” is.  For nearly 50 years, and for more than a century earlier under different names, WRDA has been the path that harbor deepening and inland waterway projects—not to mention flood protection and shore and environmental restoration projects—have taken to Federal approval.

Project ideas graduate from feasibility studies to be authorized for funding by Congress. WRDA is how the Harbor Maintenance Tax and Trust Fund became law in 1986. It is how the near-completed 50-foot deepening in the Port of New York/New Jersey was authorized in 2000. And it is how the Corps of Engineers will be given the go-ahead to deepen and otherwise modify channels in the ports of Boston, Savannah, Jacksonville, Canaveral, Palm Beach, Freeport, and Corpus Christi.

Those ports, and various States and counties, will be relieved when the Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014, HR 3080, is signed by President Obama.

Passage of WRRDA 2014 was cheered in the halls of Congress. To be sure, some of the voices heard where those of lobbyists, but more prominent were the self-congratulatory speeches and tweets (#WRRDA) let loose by the legislators, especially those with projects at stake. Even Tea Partiers, who two years ago questioned why Congress should even have a role in public works, voted for the conferenced measure and made floor speeches hailing its importance to their town or to the national economic interest.

No small amount of pride was declared in proving to themselves and to the nation that Congress is capable of agreeing on major infrastructure legislation despite the fractious partisanship and anti-spending sentiment that has come to characterize this town. The bill’s reforms and deauthorization provision, which will dump $18 billion in previously authorized projects, provide the calculated and rhetorical coverage they consider essential to allow them to vote for a bill with an estimated, eventual cost in the neighborhood of $12 billion.

Yes, public works can be costly. Of course, not building such infrastructure also can be costly.

If there is an indicator that the conservatives have been hungry to vote in the affirmative on an [insert favorite jobs creation modifier] infrastructure bill and to show that Congress can do something, it is that only four House members opposed final passage despite it being a Heritage Action “key vote.” Only seven senators—also Republicans—opposed the final bill this week.

It helps that some planned projects—including unsexy port channels for goodness sake!—have in recent years been regularly reported across the country as important to US competitiveness in global commerce. The House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee leadership used it early on to educate colleagues and the public alike. Who hasn’t heard that the Panama Canal is being expanded to accommodate big ships? They must not have been listening to the President, the Vice President, the news media, etc.  Those are the same ships that the aforementioned ports in Massachusetts, Georgia, Florida, New York and New Jersey, among others, hope will come their way.

WRRDA lacks the earmarking that turned some in Congress sour on public works legislation. Instead it prescribes a more detailed process by which the legislature will receive and act on project recommendations. It is a rational process, devised on the House side and intended to be something other than earmarking while reserving the prerogative for Congress to authorize projects i.e., not leave it to the Executive to make the decisions.

The added “R” in the bill is more than for show. Reforms to current law and practice are many. Some are intended to speed the famously bureaucratic civil works process. Others introduce new process and calculus to how Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund monies are budgeted and appropriated. (I may devote some words to that in a future post and so will limit my comment here to wishing “good luck and great wisdom” to the folks at Corps headquarters whose task it will be to interpret and implement the intent of Congress.)

It will have to be seen how well the reforms will enable the Corps of Engineers to meet, and will hold them to achieve, a 3-year study mandate, for example. One test of that will be the extent to which project sponsors are willing to leave the fate of their projects in the hands of Federal planners and analysts. That is because the bill gives more flexibility to project sponsors, such as port authorities, to study, construct and finance their projects. As we have seen in Florida and South Carolina, financial commitments are being made in State capitals in order to get projects constructed and completed well ahead of whenever Federal process and funding get done.

So there is a lot in WRRDA to cheer, not the least of which is the fact that it is done. And should the congressional committees actually live up to the sense of Congress, in Section 1052, to wit, “Congress should consider a water resources development bill not less than once every [two-year] Congress,” there will be even more to cheer in the years ahead.   Pbea

2013: The Year Before the Year of LNG?

In Efficiency, Energy/Environ, Green Transportation, Infrastructure, Ports on December 29, 2013 at 4:51 pm

A year in which U.S. shipyards announced contracts for over twenty new ocean going vessels (with options for several more) is noteworthy, especially given the recent difficult times experienced by the shipbuilding industry.  What makes this fact even more significant is that LNG as a propulsion fuel is a central feature in each of these vessels, either as the intended fuel source upon delivery or at some point in the future.

So does this mean that the U.S. maritime industry in America has reached the LNG tipping point, where a tidal wave of even more marine projects will be announced in the coming year?  My short answer would be a heavily qualified, but nonetheless definite: “maybe.”

A distinction has developed between ships that will be “LNG-ready” as opposed to those that are “LNG-capable,” the difference being those vessels that will use LNG upon delivery and those that can be converted to operate on LNG at some later date.  While certain design modifications are incorporated into these ordered vessels, such as foundations for LNG fuel tanks and dual fuel main engines, they will operate on conventional diesel fuels when they are delivered.

The reasons for taking a half step to LNG rather than making the plunge are several, among them the additional cost of the entire fuel gas system, including the fuel tanks.  However I suspect the greatest reason is uncertainty related to LNG supplies in the ports where these vessels will call.  This is particularly the case with the product tankers that have been ordered that, unlike the LNG-powered container vessels do not operate in a classic point-to-point liner service.  Their deployment is largely dictated by cargo availabilities throughout the United States and thus, until LNG is more widely available, the owners will likely hold back on a full commitment to LNG.

If one is looking for positive signs on the infrastructure front, they are there.  The Port Fourchon terminal project on the Gulf of Mexico in Southern Louisiana is being developed by Harvey Gulf Marine to serve its fleet of LNG-powered offshore service vessels.  It will be the first operational LNG bunkering facility in the United States and is expected to be operational next year.  Clean Energy has announced its intent to construct facilities dedicated to the marine industry in Jacksonville.  Tote, Inc. issued a request for proposal (RFP) to potential LNG suppliers to provide LNG for their vessel operations based in Tacoma, Washington and Jacksonville, Florida.  Each announcement of new LNG-powered ships results in a deluge of phone calls from potential LNG suppliers seeking meetings and making proposals to vessel owners.  So again, there is clear movement, growing interest and some tangible progress; but it is slow and these projects still face regulatory challenges and uncertainty that may result in delays and higher costs.

Given the delivery schedules of the Tote, Inc. ships, in late 2015 and early 2016, and the Crowley vessels in 2017,  it seems that the window for putting bunker infrastructure in place—completing land acquisition, clearing Federal and local permit requirements, and facility construction—is growing very tight.  This raises the possibility of ships being delivered and no LNG being available, which will greatly increase operating costs due to the requirements to use ultra-low sulfur diesel (ULSD) to meet Emission Control Area (ECA) regulations.

So, to offer a slightly more elaborate answer to the tipping point question, the U.S. is closer today than a year ago but one cannot conclude that the LNG revolution has begun.  Of the limited number of Jones Act liner operators, three have already announced projects–Matson being the third–and another has announced intentions to convert existing vessels to LNG. The product tanker market has been effectively replaced over the last ten years so there are limits to the expansion there.  I think the greatest opportunities for achieving critical mass in a marine fuel transformation can be found when and if several large harbor services or tug and barge companies either convert existing tugs to LNG or CNG or acquire new tonnage or the top-tier international liner companies announce new construction programs with LNG-fuelled vessels.  Either – and certainly both – of these developments would be a critical next step to accelerate widespread LNG deployment.

Marine vessels represent the potential for a large concentrated market for LNG/CNG, and a port that has both ocean going and harbor vessels that need LNG for fuel would surely provide sufficient basis for investments in LNG marine terminal infrastructure for bunkering.

While there is still a way to go until we all agree that the breakthrough has occurred we are seeing some decisions and investments that are the necessary predicate to making LNG a common transportation fuel throughout the country.  John E. Graykowski

LNG: Ports as a Catalyst?

In Energy/Environ, Green Transportation, MTS Policy, Ports on October 10, 2013 at 8:47 am

MTS Matters welcomes a well-known and regarded figure in D.C. transportation circles. John Graykowski, a Principal of Maritime Industry Consultants, served as Deputy Administrator of the Maritime Administration, and for two years as Acting Administrator, during the Clinton Administration. He is an attorney with experience in both private and public sectors. The subject of LNG-fueled transportation and how it might develop in the context of maritime policy and port communities has been a focus of his attention in recent years. This is the first of his contributions to this blog’s musings on port/maritime policy—present and future.

Over the past year, LNG as a marine fuel has gone from novel concept to an accepted alternative fuel here in the United States. Some LNG-capable vessels are operating and more will be under construction as appreciation is growing for the environmental, economic and energy security benefits offered by LNG. This transformation of a marine cargo commodity to emerging marine fuel in here and elsewhere might lead one to conclude that the broad deployment of LNG throughout the U.S. is underway and faces no challenges or constraints—but this is not the case. Lagging behind LNG-fueled vessel development here are the necessary market and regulatory structures that promote its widespread development.

The most common platitude in any discussion of LNG is the “chicken and egg” problem. Ship owners are loathe to make the large capital investment in LNG technologies absent certainty of supply.  Meanwhile gas suppliers are averse to spending $150 million or more on bunkering infrastructure without firm, long term purchase contracts by ship owners. This reflects the lack of historic relationships between the gas supply industry and marine operators, who purchase bunker fuel in virtually every port on a spot basis and never needed long term contracts.

Compounding that is a lack of understanding and knowledge about each other’s industries. Marine operators are not familiar with gas production, transportation and market dynamics and gas suppliers have little direct knowledge about the marine industry practices, requirements, and the like. Emblematic of the divide between the two industries is the simple fact that marine operators purchase fuel on the basis of metric tons or barrels of oil, while the gas industry sells LNG on the basis of million BTUs. Potentially complicating this market disconnect, are increasingly stringent accounting rules that likely require a long term LNG contract to be carried as a contingent liability, thus impairing a balance sheet and constraining future capital expenditures for a marine company.

Beyond these market issues are significant regulatory challenges related to both operational procedures for bunkering vessels and, more importantly, the siting, permitting and operation of small and medium sized LNG marine terminals. It may come as a surprise to some, but there are no existing uniform federal regulatory structures that apply specifically to LNG marine fueling terminals.

The United States Coast Guard (USCG) and Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Administration (PHMSA) each have regulations that apply to LNG fueling terminals. These regulations, however, were developed with large scale export and import facilities in mind and thus are largely inapplicable to a small marine fuel terminal and the fueling of other than LNG carriers. In many cases these regulations may conflict, which creates a large area of potential regulatory confusion and will most likely result in ad hoc development of LNG regulations. Adding to this uncertainty is the probable requirement that these facilities will be subject to local permitting actions, which can provide opponents of LNG the opportunity to intervene and delay the project.

Where do ports fit in this puzzle of a marketplace?

Ports can and should be a catalyst to spur LNG development throughout the transportation industries since they are at the center of marine activities in the United States. They provide a ready-made, multi-modal market for LNG expansion beyond large oceangoing vessels, which includes ferries and harbor craft, trucking, and rail operations. Port agencies may have some degree of jurisdiction, and even control, over property where LNG operations will occur. Depending on the port, it may have a role in the siting, permitting, financing, development, or even operations of an LNG fueling terminal. As a responsible economic development agency, a port can also play a critical role in the public education and promotion of LNG and the mitigation of local opposition to such projects.

Public port agencies generally understand this is a constructive role they are in a position to play. We are seeing that in isolated initiatives, notably on the West Coast, as well on an international scale with Antwerp leading a working group that includes the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach.

The expansion of LNG and compressed natural gas (CNG) as a replacement fuel in port related operations, already showing benefits, is also a powerful tool that ports can use to achieve significant emissions reductions and thus reduce the cost and impact of increasingly more stringent environmental regulations or measures to meet local community demands. If LNG is used to fuel vessels’ auxiliary generators while in port there may be no need to install costly shore power systems for cold ironing since equivalent emissions results could be obtained with LNG.

Collectively, ports can be in the forefront of a “Green” initiative, leading to the expansion of LNG as a transportation fuel throughout the nation. Individually, ports that facilitate LNG bunkering operations could find them to be a competitive factor in attracting and retaining liner business as those companies bring LNG-capable vessels on line to meet IMO global standards by 2020.

Much has been written of the significant impact that domestically produced natural gas and its liquefied form will have on our on our nation. Ports are where all surface modes of commercial transportation intersect and where LNG distribution will naturally occur. They are in a position to be influential in the development of national policies that promote and accommodate the broad deployment of LNG as a transportation fuel.
John E. Graykowski


The Murray-Cantwell Approach to Problem Solving

In Competition, Congress, Infrastructure, Intermodal, Water Resources on September 23, 2013 at 7:05 pm

This past week State of Washington Senators Patty Murray and Maria Cantwell introduced the Maritime Goods Movement Act of 2013 (S. 1905). Their inspiration for legislation came from what I have described as the unintended consequences of the Harbor Maintenance Tax, starting with complaints from the ports of Seattle and Tacoma that the Canadian competition to the north and the shippers, who are obliged to pay the Harbor Maintenance Tax when entering U.S. ports, were taking full advantage of the cost-differential where the HMT does not apply.

It is a complaint that was given some appearance of validity in a Federal Maritime Commission report issued last year and, a bit more convincingly, by data comparisons published by The Journal of Commerce last month.

At the request of the senators the FMC studied the role played by the HMT (0.125% of cargo value) in decisions to use the Vancouver and Prince Rupert gateways. The report, adopted by the FMC commissioners on a party line vote, didn’t make a strong case as to cause and effect. It did suggest that if an equivalent of the tax were applied in Canada “a portion of the U.S. cargo…likely would revert to using U.S. West Coast ports.” The report concluded by suggesting any remedy is in the hands of Congress not the regulatory agency.

The JOC looked at the issue by comparing market share within the PNW and among U.S. West Coast ports, where the HMT is uniformly applied. This is their finding in a nutshell:

Port data collected by The Journal of Commerce shows clearly that while Seattle and Tacoma have lost no market share relative to U.S. West Coast ports, their market share in the Pacific Northwest, a region that includes the Canadian ports of Vancouver and Prince Rupert, has slipped significantly in recent years.

That may not be conclusive of HMT culpability but it is indicative of competitive weakness just south of the 49th Parallel.  The comparative strength in British Columbia could be attributed to the HMT in addition to other factors, among them the efficient intermodal delivery system established as part of Canada’s ongoing Pacific Gateway Transportation Strategy.

Enter the Maritime Goods Movement Act User Fee proposed in the bill. The HMT would be repealed and then, for all practical purposes, recreated as the “MGMA User Fee.” In virtually every respect it would be like the HMT. The principal difference is that it also would be applied to U.S. bound cargo that first enters North America through Canada or Mexico.  Shippers would pay when the cargo crosses the land border.  On this bill rest the hopes of Puget Sound’s largest ports.

But the senators didn’t stop there. They also decided to try to fix the issue that is troubling most U.S. ports—the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund. The bill would make several changes—including expanded uses of the HMTF such as are found in the Senate-passed WRDA (S. 601)—but let’s here focus on the greatest failing of the law as it now stands. That is the under-spending of HMTF funds.

Unlike the RAMP Act that would rely on a parliamentary mechanism to leverage full funding over the objections of appropriators, and unlike the WRDA bills of the Senate and House that set funding targets at which appropriators might aim, the MGMA bill uses a direct approach. At the bottom of page 10 is this: “[N]o fee may be collected…except to the extent that the expenditure of the fee [for allowable activities] is provided for in advance in an appropriations Act.” It is a rarely used means tying revenue collections to the spending of those revenues. The transaction would occur outside the section 302 allocations that cap appropriations committee spending. In doing so it would remove the incentive for appropriators to limit allocations and would treat the HMTF more like a dedicated trust fund.

This approach is employed in other areas of government where a user fee is collected to support a specific function of government. The only downside is that to meet the requirements of budget rules Congress also would have to identify offsetting revenue to fill the hole that would be created when, as a first step to creating the new MGMA User Fee, the HMT would be repealed, thereby eliminating 10 years of projected revenue.  Yes, it gets murky down deep in the budget process. But the result would be the very easily understood concept of “dollars in, dollars out,” as a Murray aide summarized.

Finding the offset, in the range of billions of dollars, presents a real challenge to the bill sponsors. There is a reason why other attempts at legislative solutions have produced little more than “sense of Congress” statements of principle and funding targets that are…well…just targets. The climb up this legislative Hill is very steep and the obstacles—including leadership objections and the search for offsetting revenue—have been daunting.

While we are noting the degree of incline ahead, let’s add to this particular bill the likelihood of complaints to the State Department from Mexico and Canada, who are major U.S. trading partners, and opposition from shippers and the railroads that carry their cargo into the U.S.

But that doesn’t mean it is the wrong solution to an HMTF problem that has existed since the early 1990s. It is the right one because it would be a more effective and lasting way to link the revenue to the reason for the revenue, which is to keep American harbor channels maintained and our ports competitive.  Pbea


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